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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
DUANE E. POTTS, ] 
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) APPELLEE'S REPLY 
) BRIEF 
) Case No. 20030702-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
In the instant case, the State appeals from an order quashing the bindover order on an 
information charging Appellee with one count of Communications Fraud, a second degree 
felony. This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-l and§78-2a-3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDE THAT THE 
STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING? 
The ultimate decision as to whether to bind a defendant over to answer charges in the 
district court is a question of law reviewed without deference to the court below. See State 
v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464,466 (Utah 1991). "However, a magistrate's factual findings may 
require some deference by a reviewing court." State v. Woodscow, 869 P.2d 29, 30 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ACT WITHIN ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DISMISSED THE INSTANT CASE CITING THE STATE'S 
FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S 
MOTION AND ITS FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE APPOINTED 
TIME TO ARGUE SAID MOTION? 
A trial court has inherent authority to govern courtroom proceedings and to impose 
appropriate sanctions. Rohan v. Bozeman, 46 P.3d 753,759 (Utah App. 2002); citing Jensen 
v. Bowman, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995); Stewart v. Publ. Serv. Com., 885 P.2d 759,782 
(Utah 1994). Therefore, the subject order should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
A two-count Information filed on December 27, 2001, charged Appellee with 
Tampering with Evidence, a second degree felony in violation Utah Code Ann. §76-8-510 
(repealed), and Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-10-1801. 
(Rec. at 1-2, 53). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On November 14, 2002, Appellee moved to dismiss Count I, Tampering with 
Evidence. The issue was briefed by both parties and on January 3, 2003, the District Court 
granted Appellee's motion finding that the charging statute was repealed nine months before 
charges were filed. (Rec. at 52-54). This order was not appealed. On May 23, 2003, the 
State filed an amended information charging Defendant with one count of Communications 
Fraud, a second degree felony. (Rec. at 69-70). A preliminary hearing was held on May 22, 
2003. Defendant was bound over to answer the charge in the district court. (Rec. at 72, 
152). A transcript of the preliminary hearing was filed in the district court on June 10,2003. 
(Rec. at 72,152). Appellee moved to quash the magistrate's bindover order on July 7,2003. 
(Rec. at 76-90). The matter was set to be heard on August 1,2003, at 8:30 a.m. and the State 
received notice of the hearing. (Rec. at 91-92). Counsel for the State failed to respond to 
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Defendant's motion in writing and failed to appear at the hearing. The District Court 
consequently granted Appellee's Motion to Quash. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
Appellee's motion to quash was granted on August 1, 2003, after the State failed to 
respond in writing and failed to appear for the motion hearing. On August 4, 2003, the 
district court entered an order stating that the motion was granted for three reasons, each in 
the alternative: the State failed to establish probable cause that the crime charged was 
committed; the State failed to establish probable cause that, if a crime was committed, it was 
committed by Appellee; and, in the alternative, because the State failed to respond to 
Appellee's motion or to appear at the motion hearing. (Rec. at 107-08). 
D. Statement of Material Facts 
As previously stated, a preliminary hearing was held in the above captioned case on 
May 22, 2003. The State called only one witness, Captain Kelly Sparks, from whom the 
following facts were adduced. Captain Sparks (hereinafter Sparks) tes tified that he took part 
in an Internal Affairs investigation involving Duane Potts (hereinafter Appellee). Appellee 
was a police officer and Sparks was investigating whether he had accepted a gratuity from 
a subordinate officer in exchange for special treatment. In January 2000, Sparks interviewed 
Appellee and asked him specifically about the allegations. Both Sparks and Appellee 
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recorded this interview on separate recording devices. (P.H.6-7). Sparks' recording device 
failed to record part of the interview and one side of one of Sparks' tapes was blank. (P.H. 
8-9). However, during the interview, both Sparks and Appellee touched their recorders to 
change tapes, or to turn the tape over. (P.H. 34). Appellee was subsequently dismissed as a 
police officer. 
Later that year, the Career Service Council conducted two hearings to consider 
Appellee's reinstatement as a police officer. At the first hearing, in March 2000, neither the 
tape recorded by Appellee nor the tape recorded by Sparks were admitted into evidence. 
(P.H. 8-9). In July, 2000, the Counsel convened another hearing and Sparks was in 
attendance. At this second hearing, Mr. Jerry Conder, counsel for Appellee, admitted 
portions of a recording into evidence. Less than two minutes of the lengthy recording was 
admitted at this hearing. (P.H. 13-14,22). 
The portion of the tape offered by Mr. Conder included questions and answers as to 
whether Appellee accepted a palm pilot from Deputy Chris Sorensen. Specifically, the 
portion of the tape played at the hearing included the following discourse. 
Sparks: Did you accept the palm pilot? 
Potts: No. 
(P.H. 26-27). Sparks never heard the tape presented at this hearing in its entirety. (P.H. 22). 
Furthermore, he did not know whether the tape offered by Mr. Conder was the original or 
was a copy. (P.H. 18). 
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Sparks, present at the second hearing, felt that the tape offered by Mr. Conder 
portrayed the interview inaccurately. Sparks based this conclusion on his memory of the 
conversation and some of his notes. He never compared the recording offered by Mr. Conder 
to his own recording and did not know of anyone else who did. (P.H. 32-33, 36-37). Sparks 
remembered that, after he asked, "did you accept a palm pilot?" Appellee replied that he 
reluctantly kept the Palm Pilot, that there was no exchange for work assignments, and that 
he no longer knew where it was." (P.H. 25-26). He did not remember Appellee simply 
answering no. Because noone listened to the allegedly altered tape in its entirety and because 
the tape was not admitted into evidence, it was not possible to determine whether the 
discourse Sparks recalled was recorded elsewhere on the tape. 
The tape offered by Mr. Conder at the Career Service Counsel hearing was eventually 
forwarded to the Secret Service for analysis. Sparks did not know when the tape was 
submitted to the Secret Service, where the tape was before it was submitted, or what 
instructions were given to the Secret Service. (P.H. 43). The consequent Secret Service 
report was introduced into evidence at the preliminary hearing. (P.H. 30). The report 
concluded that "this laboratory cannot exactly determine the authenticity of [the submitted 
tape]." (Report P. 3). However, the report revealed only three "probable alterations" where 
the word "no" may have been artificially inserted. The word "no" may have been inserted 
in the following dialogues: 
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Sparks: Do you recall making critical remarks about Sergeant Jensen besides 
the one you told me about? 
Potts: No. 
* * * 
Sparks: Do you recall being derogatory or critical of other sergeants, other 
patrol sergeants? 
Potts: No. 
* * * 
Sparks: Did Debbie Sorenson give you a call [unintelligible]? 
Potts: No. 
(Report P. 2). It should be noted that Debbie Sorensen is not the same person as Deputy 
Chris Sorensen, who allegedly gave Appellee a palm pilot. (See P.H. 22 Sparks refers to 
Mr. Sorensen, not Ms. Sorensen). There were no other instances where the word "no" was 
possibly inserted. 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Magistrate bound Appellee over to 
the District Court. The court returned the Secret Service report to the prosecution. (P.H. at 
59). On June 10,2003, a transcript of the preliminary hearing was filed with the court. (Rec. 
at 72). On July 7, 2003, Appellee moved to quash the magistrate's bindover order. A 
hearing on the motion to quash was set for August 1, 2003, at 8:30 a.m. On that date, the 
instant case was called at 9:06 a.m. (Rec. at 154). The State had not filed any written 
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response to Defendant's motion and was not present when the case was called. The court 
granted Appellee's motion on three alternative grounds: because the State failed to establish 
probable cause that a crime was committed; because the State did not prove that, if a crime 
was committed, it was committed by Appellee; and, in the alternative, because the State 
failed to respond or appear in relation to the motion. The State subsequently filed a motion 
to reconsider the Court's prior ruling. (See Rec. at 119). However, there is no record 
indicating that the State sought the Court's ruling on the motion to reconsider. The State's 
reply memorandum in this regard was filed on the same date as its notice of appeal. (Rec at 
119,133). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although the State appears to raise only one issue in its appeal, the District Court 
granted Appellee's motion to dismiss for three reasons, each in the alternative. Therefore, 
before this Court may reverse the dismissal, it must determine that the District Court erred 
in all three instances. Consequently, there are three related but distinct issues before this 
Court. This Court must determine whether the State established probable cause that the 
crime of Communications Fraud was committed; whether there was probable cause to 
determine that Appellee committed the crime; and finally, whether the court properly 
dismissed the case given the State's failure to respond to the motion or otherwise appear in 
relation to it. 
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In the instant case, the State called but one witness, Detective Sparks. He testified that 
only a small portion of the subject tape was played at the reinstatement hearing. Even if the 
tape was altered, there can only be a finding of Communications Fraud if the altered portion 
of the tape was played at the hearing: if the altered portion was communicated. In the instant 
case, Sparks testified that he had never listened to the tape in its entirety and so could not 
determine whether the allegedly altered parts of the tape were the portions introduced at the 
hearing. Where the State has presented no evidence going to the communication element of 
Communications Fraud, it failed to establish probable cause that the charged crime was 
committed. 
Moreover, the tape was not introduced by Appellee, it was introduced by counsel 
representing him at the reinstatement hearing. Again, the State presented no evidence 
showing that Defendant presented the tape to his counsel or otherwise asked him to present 
it on his behalf. Where the State presented no evidence in this regard, it was improper to 
presume that Defendant gave the tape to counsel or otherwise asked him to present the tape. 
Finally, the district court also dismissed the case "for the reason that the State has not 
responded or appeared." The State characterizes this as a sanction for counsel's tardiness. 
However, it was not a sanction. Rather, it was a response to the failure of the adversarial 
process necessary to our system of criminal justice. It would have been inappropriate for the 
trial court to have made the State's argument where the State itself failed to do so. 
Therefore, the trial court appropriately ruled on the only argument it had to consider: that of 
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Appellee. However, even if the court did dismiss the case as a sanction against the State, 
given the State's failure to follow the court's orders, dismissal was an appropriate remedy. 
For the foregoing reasons, each in the alternative, the trial court's order of dismissal 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STATE 
FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING; THEREFORE, THE ORDER GRANTING APPELLEE'S 
MOTION TO QUASH SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present evidence sufficient for the 
magistrate to find [p]robable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and 
that the defendant has committed it." State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1999) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). If the State fails to do so, any consequent 
bindover order should be quashed. In State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001), the court 
clarified the quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover order. The court explained 
that the prosecution must produce "believable evidence of all the elements of the crime 
charged" in order to sustain its burden at the preliminary hearing. Id. at ffif 15 (citations and 
internal quotation omitted). Granted, the evidence must be viewed "in a light most favorable 
to the prosecution" with reasonable inferences resolved in the prosecution's favor. Talbot, 
972 P.2d at 437-38. However, the prosecution must still present at least some evidence going 
to each element of the crime and must establish probable cause that the charged crime was 
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committed and that the defendant committed it. Id. In the instant case, this burden was not 
met, such that Appellee's motion to quash was properly granted. 
A. It did not constitute plain error for the court to consider Appelleefs 
motion where a secret service report was not on file but where the 
court had access to both the Stated and Appellee's summaries of the 
report. 
The State argues that the Court issued its ruling based on an incomplete record. More 
specifically, the State argues, "it is not clear that defendant provided a copy of the 
preliminary hearing transcript to Judge Frederick in moving to quash and dismiss." (Aplt. 
Br. at 13). This argument lacks merit notwithstanding the fact that it was not raised in the 
District Court and so must withstand a plain error analysis. The State, somewhat 
surprisingly, fails to note in its brief that a complete transcript of the preliminary hearing was 
filed with the court on June 10,2003. (Rec. at 72,152). Therefore, the transcript was filed 
with the court just under one month before Appellee filed his motion to quash and almost two 
months before the court issued its order granting Appellee's motion. Where the court had 
a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript months before it ruled on Appellee's motion, the 
State's argument that Appellee should have submitted a transcript with his motion is without 
merit. 
The State raises a related argument for the first time on appeal. The State argues that 
Appellee was required to forward to the court a copy of the Secret Service Report addressing 
whether the tape at issue had been altered. Notably, the State has not attached a copy of this 
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report to its brief but, nonetheless, asks this Court to consider whether it established probable 
cause at the preliminary hearing. Therefore, the State's own argument indicates that this 
Court cannot properly review the propriety of the District Court's ruling. If it was error for 
Appellee not to forward the report with his motion to quash, the State has erred by failing to 
submit the report as part of its appeal. The State argues that the District Court could not 
consider Appellee's motion because Appellee failed to forward a copy of the report to the 
Court. If the State's argument is correct, then this Court cannot properly consider the State's 
appeal where the State has not forwarded a copy of the report and has failed to meet its 
burden in this regard. l 
Furthermore, "[a]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holegate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 2000); citing State v. Marvin, 964 
P.2d 313,318 (Utah 1998). This argument was never raised in the District Court such that 
the court's order should only be reversed if it constituted plain error. Id. 
" To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing 
(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error is harmful.1" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,ffif 11, 
5 P.3d 1222 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 
"To show obviousness of the error, [Defendant] must show that the law was 
clear at the time of trial." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 at ffij 6,18 P.3d 1123; see 
also State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct.App.1997) ("Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that a trial couifs error is not plain where there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court."). 
State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101, 103 (Utah App. 2002). 
*It should be noted that Appellee has included this report as Addendum I. 
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In the instant case, no error existed and, in the alternative, any error was not obvious. 
While the trial court may not have had a copy of the secret service report itself, it had 
recorded testimony regarding the contents of the report and summaries by both the State and 
Appellee. In argument at the preliminary hearing the State described the report as follows: 
In addition, you have the Secret Service report which notes five 
different points where- -where the tape was altered. And most- - and the one 
which jumps out, which is the one which Captain Sparks remembers exactly, 
is that, number one, it says at 1307, there were - - are indications of an edit 
between the word "palm" and "I" in the sentence. If it was one down on the 
(inaudible) he says I got this palm, edit, I says I don't need a palm pilot, I don't 
know what it is. The very beginning of what is possibly the "pilot" can be 
heard just before the edit point. 
And then it discusses five other points of edit. In addition, it mentions 
that there was a 130-second difference between the side of the tape which was 
analyzed where these edits occurred, which all occurred on the tape- - on the 
portion of the tape which Captain Sparks did not have a copy of, that his one 
tape didn't record. 
And the report goes on and explains kind of how there are certain 
"no's" which are reported, which can be done, edited digitally in order to do 
that. 
(P.H. at 49-50). 
Moreover, Appellee explained in his motion as follows: 
The report concluded that "this laboratory cannot exactly determine the 
authenticity of [the submitted tape]." (Report P. 3). However, the report 
revealed only three "probable alterations" where the word "no" may have been 
artificially inserted. The word "no" may have been inserted in the following 
dialogues: 
Sparks: Do you recall making critical remarks about Sergeant 
Jensen besides the one you told me about? 
Potts: No. 
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Sparks: Do you recall being derogatory or critical of other 
sergeants, other patrol sergeants? 
Potts: No. 
* * * 
Sparks: Did Debbie Sorenson give you a call [unintelligible]? 
Potts: No. 
(Rec. at 78-90). 
Where the court had summaries of the contents of the report from both the State and 
Appellee, it did not constitute obvious error for the court to rely on those summaries 
especially where the State never challenged the summaries' correctness or completeness. 
Again, it is the State's burden in this instance to show that plain error existed. Moreover, an 
error is only obvious if the pertinent case law is settled. Id. 
The State cites but one case in support of its argument in this regard: State v. 
Woodscow, 896 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1995). However, Woodscow is distinguished such that 
any alleged error in the instant case was not obvious. In Woodscow, the court reasoned that, 
in regards to a motion to quash, the reviewing court must afford significant deference to the 
magistrate's findings of fact, particularly in regards to the credibility of witnesses. Id. There, 
the district court disregarded, or was not presented with, the magistrate's findings of fact 
regarding the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, the court did not have the entire 
preliminary hearing transcript to consider. In contrast, here, the Court had the entire 
preliminary hearing transcript, including the magistrate's stated findings of fact. Moreover, 
the court had summaries of the missing document from both the State and the defense and 
no indication that these summaries were incomplete or inaccurate. Under these 
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circumstances, any error was not obvious because the case law was not settled as to the issue 
at bar. 
Moreover, there was not plain error in this case because the State cannot show that 
this error was harmful. An error is harmful only if, "absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [State]." State v. Vargas, 20 P.3d 271 (Utah 
2001). In the instant case, the combined summaries offered both by the State and by the 
Defense accurately described all material aspects of the report. Therefore, where the trial 
court had all material information included in the report, the State cannot show that, had the 
court had the report itself, the ruling would have been in the State's favor. 
Therefore, in the instant case, this issue should not be considered for the first time on 
appeal where the State cannot show that it constituted plain error. Any error committed by 
the trial court was not obvious and, moreover, any error was not harmful. 
B. At the Preliminary Hearing, the State Did Not Establish Probable 
Cause That a Crime Had Been Committed 
One of the most basic precepts involved in a preliminary hearing is that the State must 
establish probable cause that a crime has been committed. Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437. To this 
end, the prosecution must produce "believable evidence of all the elements of the crime 
charged." State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001). 
Appellee has been charged with Communications Fraud under §76-10-1801. That 
section reads in pertinent part as follows: 
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(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to . . . obtain from 
another . . . anything of value by means of false or fraudulent . . . 
representations . . . and who communicates . . . with any person . . . for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud 
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801. Again, the burden was on the state to present 
"believable evidence" going to each of the foregoing elements. Clarke, 20 P.3d at 300. 
Regarding the first element, that Appellee devised a scheme or artifice, the State 
presented two facts: (1) In an interview in January 2000, Sparks asked, "Did you accept the 
palm pilot?" Appellee answered that he did, that it wasn't in exchange for anything, and that 
he no longer knew where it was. (P.H. 32-33, 36-37). (2) at a Career Services Counsel 
hearing Appellee's attorney introduced a portion of a tape where he was asked, "Did you 
accept the palm pilot?" and he answered "no." (PH 26-27). Before the Court can find any 
evidence of a scheme or artifice it must make the logical leap that Appellee, therefore, altered 
this portion of the tape: that Appellee deleted his explanation and inserted the word "no." 
Granted the State does not ask this Court to make this logical leap without support. 
The State presented two pieces of evidence in an effort to make this necessary logical 
connection: Mr. Sparks' memory, and a report by the Secret Service. (P.H. 26-27, 30). 
However, neither piece of evidence indicates that the alleged alteration was ever made. 
Sparks remembers asking Appellee "Did you accept the palm pilot?" and he 
remembers Appellee responding that he did but no longer knew where it was. (P.H. 26-27). 
Sparks also remembers attending a Counsel hearing where Mr. Conder played less than two 
minutes of a tape. Sparks remembers that, in those two minutes, Appellee never admitted 
accepting the palm pilot and never explained that he no longer knew where it was. The 
problem is that Sparks never heard the tape in its entirety. He only ever heard less than two 
minutes of it. (P.H. 13-14,22). Therestof Appellee's response is likely elsewhere on that 
tape. It is not uncommon for an interviewer to ask the same question more than once, 
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especially if the first answer is unsatisfactory. Sparks does not claim to remember the entire 
interview verbatim, and no complete recording was presented to the court at the preliminary 
hearing. This Court cannot conclude that the tape was altered absent a showing that 
Appellee's "deleted answer" is not located elsewhere on the tape. The State failed to present 
any evidence as to what was on the rest of the tape. It thus failed to meet its burden in this 
regard. 
The report from the Secret Service further indicates that the answer Sparks expected 
to hear was elsewhere on the tape. While the report may give rise to probable cause that the 
tape was altered. It concludes, fairly unequivocally, that the alteration at issue was never 
made. There are only three instances on that tape where there is reason to believe that the 
word "no" was inserted. There were insertions after the following questions: Do you recall 
making critical remarks about Sergeant Jensen besides the one you told me about? Do you 
recall being derogatory or critical of other sergeants, other patrol sergeants? Did Debbie 
Sorenson give you a call? There is absolutely no indication that the word "no" was inserted 
after the question "did you accept the palm pilot?" 
Even if Appellee altered other parts of the tape, he did not commit Communications 
Fraud unless those other parts were played at the Counsel hearing. However, there is no 
evidence that any other possible alteration was played at the hearing: there is no evidence that 
another alteration was communicated. Therefore, the State failed to present evidence going 
to an essential element of the crime charged and the instant case should be dismissed. 
C. The State Failed to Present Evidence That Defendant, Rather than 
Someone Else, Committed the Crime. 
Again, one of the most basic precepts involved in a preliminary hearing is that the 
State must establish probable cause that a crime has been committed. Talbot, 972 P.2d at 
437. However, the State must also establish probable cause that the defendant, rather than 
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someone else, committed the crime. Id. Here, even if the alteration at issue was made, there 
is no evidence that Appellee made it. Similarly, even if the alteration was made and Appellee 
made it, there is no evidence that he communicated the alteration to anyone. In either case, 
the State has failed to present evidence going to an essential element of the crime charged 
and the case was properly dismissed. 
The crux of this argument is that all of the evidence shows that Mr. Conder, not 
Appellee, presented the tape to the Career Service Counsel. There is no evidence that 
Appellee communicated the alteration to anyone. Mr. Conder, not Appellee, admitted two 
minutes of the tape into evidence: Mr. Conder communicated the alteration. Again, 
communication is an essential element of communications fraud. Since the State presented 
no evidence going to an essential element of the crime, the instant case was properly 
dismissed. 
Not only is there no evidence that the alteration at issue was made, and no evidence 
that Appellee communicated the alteration, there is no evidence that Appellee made the 
alteration. Immediately before Mr. Conder admitted the tape into evidence, the tape was in 
his possession. It is entirely possible that he made the alterations. Moreover, no evidence 
was presented going to the chain of custody from the time the tape was played at the Counsel 
hearing to the time it was analyzed by the Secret Service. In the absence of such evidence, 
the State failed to meet its burden in this regard. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY 
GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION GIVEN THE STATE'S 
FAILURE TO RESPOND OR TO APPEAR TO ARGUE THE 
MERITS OF THE MOTION. 
At the outset, it is important to clarify the precise reason that the court granted 
Appellee's motion. The State argues that the case was dismissed as a sanction against the 
prosecution for being tardy. (Aplt. Br. at 11). However, the court never stated that its ruling 
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was intended as a sanction on the state. More accurately, he stated that the Appellee's 
motion was granted "for the reason that the State has not responded or appeared." (Rec. at 
108). When one party fails to respond to a motion or to otherwise appear or argue it, the 
court is left with only one party's position. In the adversarial system of criminal justice it is 
not the judge's role to make the argument for either side. It would have been inappropriate 
for the court to have made the State's argument in order to deny Appellee's motion. 
Therefore, the dismissal was not a sanction for tardiness but merely the proper application 
of the adversarial process where the judge's role is not to make arguments but to evaluate 
them. Here, the State had almost two months to file a written response to Appellee's motion; 
however, they chose not to do so. Moreover, counsel for the State did not appear to argue 
the motion at the appointed time. Therefore, the trial court had only Appellee's undisputed 
assertions raised in his argument. In this case, the trial court permissibly and appropriately 
declined to make the State's argument for them. Left with only Appellee's assertions and 
argument the court granted the motion "for the reason that the State has not responded or 
appeared." (Rec. at 108). In this case the adversarial system of justice failed, the judge 
merely acted accordingly and did not intend the order of dismissal as a sanction against the 
state for tardiness. Therefore, the State's argument in this regard is misplaced. 
This is similar to a situation confronted by the court in State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 
(Utah 1994). There, the State arguably, at sentencing, mischaracterized the facts surrounding 
the offense. More specifically the State did not explain that the evidence tended to show that 
the victim was shot while he and the defendant were fighting to gain control of the gun. 
However, defense counsel did not argue that the State's version of facts was incomplete. The 
court reasoned that this "failure to respond allowed the trial court to assume that the 
prosecutors characterization of the facts was a true and complete version of those facts, even 
though all the facts that had been developed showed that the fatal shot was fired while 
Holland and the victim fought over a gun." Id. The trial court's "assumption" was not a 
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sanction on defense counsel for failing to respond but was merely a reaction to the 
breakdown of the adversarial system of criminal justice. 
However, even if this court determines that the dismissal in this case was meant as a 
sanction for the prosecutor's failure to respond to the motion or to appear, the court acted 
within its discretion by dismissing the case. As Utah courts have repeatedly noted, a trial 
court has the inherent authority to govern courtroom proceeding and to impose appropriate 
sanctions. Rohan v. Bozeman, 46 P.3d 753,759 (Utah App. 2002); citing Jensen v. Bowman, 
892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995); Stewart v. Publ Serv. Com., 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 
1994). Furthermore, the act of dismissing a case where the prosecution failed to respond to 
a defense motion is not without precedent in Utah. In Provo City v. Lundahl, 2001 UT App. 
40 (Utah App. 2001) (Unpublished opinion, attached at Add. A), The trial court dismissed 
a criminal case where the State failed to respond to a defense motion.2 In the instant case, 
there was a consistent and repeated approach of indifference demonstrated by the State. The 
State had almost two months to respond to Appellee's motion but failed to do so, arguably 
in violation of Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501, which, "[t]he responding party shall 
file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation."3 Moreover, when the case was 
called for oral argument, the State failed to appear to even argue the motion orally. In 
response to this pattern of demonstrated indifference, the court acted within its discretion by 
dismissing the case. 
2It should be noted that the propriety of dismissal was not addressed by this Court 
because it found that the appeal did not raise any cognizable issues. 
3This rule appears under the heading "Civil Practice." However, the rule explains that 
"[tjhis rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record." Therefore, by its 
plain language, it applies in the instant, albeit criminal, case 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial 
court's order dismissing the instant case. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter. 
A-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _3 day of April, 2004. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
©VvcJ^L \A 
NALD J. YENGICH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this ^ day of April, 2004, to: 
Marianne Decker 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM I 
RB*ORT 
United States Secret Service 
Office of Investigations 
Forensic Services Division 
Visual Information Branch 
To: SAIC - Denver Date: September 12 , 2001 
Subject: E x h i b i t Ql Case No.: 4 0 7 - 8 7 0 . 0 9 3 - 4 4 2 5 5 
SA P a s s e y 
Type of Examination: Audio A u t h e n t i c a t i o n 
**** AMENDED REPORT **** 
1 . EXHIBITS EXAMINED 
Ql is a "Maxell XLII-90" magnetic tape cassette labeled 
in part "7-21-00 TAPE #2" on side A. 
Exhibit Ql was received on 08/04/00 in a sealed 
container via Federal Express. 
The Exhibit and the results of the examination were 
returned to the Salt Lake City Resident Office on 
07/22/01 in a sealed container via Federal Express. 
2. RESULTS OF EXAMINATION 
The Exhibit was examined to determine if it had been 
altered or tampered with in any way. In the examiners' 
opinion, Side B of Exhibit Ql appears to have been 
altered from its original recorded state. All times 
referenced below are in the format minutes:seconds and 
are with respect to the beginning of Side B. 
The following probable alterations were found: 
1. At 13:07, there are indications of an edit between 
the word "palm" and "I" in the sentence "If it was 
one down on the freeway, he says I got this palm 
[edit] I says I don't need a palm pilot. I don't 
know what it is." The very beginning of what is 
possibly the word "pilot" can be heard just before 
the edit point. *- ^ 
2. At 15:37 the subject states, "I have no idea." This 
phrase appears to hgLye been inserted into the 
recording. Spectrographic analyses snow ~ l 
background noise differs noticeably from that of the 
surrounding context. At 15:17 the subject responds, 
"I have no idea" to the interviewer's question 
ending in, "...recorded questions from the paramedic 
test?" This instance does not appear to be an 
alteration, however it does appear to be aurally and 
spectrographically almost identical to the instance 
at 15:37. It appears that the response at 15:17 was 
duplicated and inserted as the responses at 15:37. 
This edit could conceal the removal of any amount of 
conversation from the recording. 
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3. At 05:34 the interviewer asks, "Do you recall making 
critical remarks about Sergeant Jensen besides the 
one you told me about [unintelligible]?" The 
subject's response, the word "no," appears to have 
been inserted into the recording due to the sudden 
drop in background noise during the word. 
4. At 06:01 the interviewer asks, "Do you recall being 
derogatory or critical of other Sergeants, other 
patrol Sergeants?" The subject's response, the word 
"no," appears to have been inserted into the 
recording due to the sudden drop in background noise 
during the word. 
5. At 11:26 the interviewer asks, "Did Debbie Sorenson 
give you a call [unintelligible]?11 The subject's 
response, the word "no," appears to have been 
inserted into the recording due to the sudden drop 
in background noise during the word. 
At 15:06 the subject responds, "no," to the 
interviewer's question, "Did you record questions from 
the paramedic test onto that tape recorder?" This 
instance of the word "no" does not appear to be an 
alteration, however, the instances of the word "no" in 
3., 4., and 5. above all appear to be aurally and 
spectrographically almost identical to each other and 
to the instance of the word "no" at 15:06. 
Eveiry instance of the word "no" or "know" spoken by the 
subject on the Exhibit was studied. The four samples 
mentioned above match almost identically. In each 
case, spectrographic analyses show a region of 
background noise level noticeably different from that 
of the surrounding context. None of the other 
instances are as closely matched. It appears that the 
response at 15:06 was duplicated and inserted as the 
responses at 05:34, 06:01 and 11:26. Each edit could 
conceal the removal of any amount of conversation from 
the recording. 
Other determinations: 
The position of the magnetic recording tracks with 
respect to each other and to the tape is consistent 
between Sides A and B. Also, the recording level of 
the left channel is higher than that of the right 
channel on each side. These are indications that the 
same machine recorded both sides of the Exhibit. This 
does not necessarily mean that both sides were recorded 
at the same time or from the same source. 
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The record level of Side B of the Exhibit is higher 
than that of Side A. Side B shows signs of automatic 
gain control, but Side A does not. The spectral 
characteristics of the background nois€> on Side B are 
similar but differ from those of the background noise 
on Side A. These are indications that Side B was 
recorded under similar but different conditions than 
that of Side A. 
Given the differences between Sides A cind B and the 
appearance of the edits on Side B listed above, in the 
examiners' opinion, Side B of Exhibit Ql appears to be 
altered recording. Without the device with which the 
recording was made, this laboratory cannot exactly 
determine the authenticity of Exhibit Ql. 
3 . REMARKS 
Following the conversation on Side B, there exists 
approximately 13 0 more seconds of recording without 
conversation. The presence of this much blank 
recording at the end could i"ae?}r *-^<* ^ ^ ^ fh^ original 
recording, if the edited recording were shorter. 
Original Exhibit Ql was unchanged by the examination. 
All processing was recorded onto different media. 
Examination by: 
Robert A. Langham Michael L. Piper^^ 
Audio / Imaging Specialist Audio / Imaging Specialist 
Approved: 
ADDENDUM II 
r a g e z u i z 
Not Reported in P.2d 
2001UTApp40 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 311184 (Utah App.)) 
Page 1 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
PROVO CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Holli LUNDAHL, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000528-CA. 
Feb. 8, 2001. 
Holli Lundahl, Midvale, pro se. 
court. The only issue before the court was 
whether Lundahl was driving on a 
suspended license and the trial court 
dismissed the charges due to Provo's 
inaction. The issues raised in Lundahl's 
motion were the subject of Case No. 
990201487, Fourth District Court, Orem 
Department, and rejected by this court in 
Case No. 20000237. 
2001 WL 311184 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 40 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Before BENCH, DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 In a May 3, 2000 minute entry, the trial court 
dismissed the case against Holli Lundahl (Lundahl) 
for driving on suspension because Provo failed to 
respond to her motion. Lundahl has filed an appeal 
from the dismissal of the case because she wanted 
the trial court to address the issues raised in her 
motion. However, she may only appeal from a 
"final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or 
plea." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l) (1999). 
Lundahl was not convicted, and, thus, has nothing 
to appeal. 
The appeal is dismissed. [FN1] 
FN1. The issues Lundahl raised in her 
motion-asking the trial court to alter a 
California decision revoking her driver's 
license and order the Utah Driver License 
Division to issue her a driver's 
license-were not properly before the trial 
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